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September 11 presented the Bush administration with the opportunity for a strategic
reorientation of American foreign policy. Contrary to the hopes of many, however,
this chance was not used to move towards a more multilateral policy, rather it was
used to mobilize resources to the benefit of a superpower policy with a strong em-
phasis on military might. In light of increased perception of asymmetrical threats and
with the War on Terrorism as legitimizing principle, those who advocate a policy
based on superior military power and unrestricted room to maneuver have succeeded
in dominating the foreign policy discourse in the US. The more such thinking deter-
mines the policy of the Bush administration  and in many areas it has already shaped
decisions  the more this will lead to strategic divergence between the US and Europe.
There have been no signs following
September 11 of a paradigm shift towards
a multilateral approach with respect the
controversial issues that have led to the
impression of a unilateral American foreign
policy. On the contrary: strategic indepen-
dence in the realm of security policy has
become the guiding principle. This was
shown quite clearly by the decision to with-
draw from the ABM treaty in December
2001 and especially through the categorical
rejection of efforts to strengthen the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention at the Fifth
Review Conference in November and
December 2001. In contrast to Europe,
multilateral arms control as an instrument
of non-proliferation is viewed as useless,
even harmful. According to American
conservatives, arms control agreements
serve to tie the hands of the US, but do not
stop determined rogue states from devel-
oping weapons of mass destruction. And in
light of an increasingly interventionist
policy as part of the War on Terrorism,
American opposition to the International
Criminal Court has stiffened.
The Neoconservative Network
Gains Ground
The challenge posed by transnational
terrorism revealed the limits of the Bush
administrations early views on geopolitical
power relations. The primacy of the fight
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against terrorism made it necessary to
collaborate with other states, and, as such,
to make tactical concessions. While the
necessity of international cooperation has
been accepted, this has not resulted in any
clear consequences for grand strategy. A
basic preference for a multilateral ap-
proach as still advocated by liberal inter-
nationalists  which does not exclude going
it alone in certain cases  is less and less
discernable.
The logic of the American System
(G. John Ikenberry), an institutionalized
form of benevolent hegemony, nevertheless
demands a certain measure of readiness to
act multilaterally. This system enables
other states to bring their interests and
perspectives to bear. That also demands
from the American side the willingness to
subject itself to the rules of multilateral
institutions and to participate in the
creation and further development of such
structures, instead of viewing international
institutions as useful only when they pro-
vide international legitimacy and reduce
the costs to the US for its foreign policy
operations.
In considering how a coalition for the
war on terrorism might take long-term
institutional form without limiting the
flexibility to act unilaterally, the State
Department has followed the traditional
logic of American foreign policy since 1945.
It is, however, unlikely that these internal
deliberations will develop into proposals
for the establishment of a new inter-
national institution.
This is in part due to the continuing loss
of influence of the moderate wing of the
Republican party since September 11. The
wing of the Republican Party committed to
military strength and moral clarity has
taken advantage of the current situation to
strengthen its position vis-à-vis the more
traditional, realist faction.
The dividing line that runs through the
administration clearly delineates two ideo-
logical camps. On one side are those who
became known in the seventies and eighties
as neoconservatives. This group combines a
skepticism of multilateral commitments
and any constraints placed on American
power with the belief in American excep-
tionalism and a special international role
for the United States. On the other side is
the Republican partys traditional realist
wing of moderate conservatives. This group
considers international institutions and
alliance partners quite useful although
mostly in an instrumental sense.
President Bushs view of American policy
follows closely that of the neoconservatives
who advocate an almost imperial foreign
policy. This influence is most clearly
evident in the concrete case of American
Middle East policy. Bush has given up any
pretense of playing the role of an even-
handed mediator and has opted instead to
grant nearly unconditional support for
Israeli policy. This, of course, is also driven
by domestic political calculations. Bush is
trying to win favor with Jewish voters, the
vast majority of whom traditionally vote for
the Democrats. Moreover, this change of
course is the result of structural changes
within the Republican party. Evangelical
fundamentalists within the party have
formed a strong pro-Israel lobby. There are
two explanations for this support. Some are
convinced that Israel has a biblical claim to
the occupied territories. Others believe that
the return of Jesus Christ and the establish-
ment of his thousand-year reign on earth
depends on the existence of a Jewish state
and its control of Jerusalem. With the out-
break of the second Intifada this appeared
to be in danger. Support for Israel thus
became one of the central concerns of
religious conservatives, who, particularly in
the South, represent a strong core of the
Republican Party. According to estimates by
Karl Rove, Bushs leading political advisor,
four million fewer evangelical Christians
voted in 2000 than expected. The mobili-
zation of this constituency for the 2004
elections is decidedly important for Bush.
There are, above all, three guiding
principles that characterize the neo-
conservative approach to foreign policy.
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Military Supremacy
First is the principle of maintaining
Americas military supremacy, independent
of potential threats and adversaries. Un-
paralleled military strength is considered to
be a guarantee for international stability
and a pre-requisite for changing the inter-
national system. This principle was clearly
expressed in President Bushs important
agenda-setting speech at West Point on June
1, 2002: Competition between great
nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in
our world is not. More and more, civilized
nations find ourselves on the same side 
united by common dangers of terrorist
violence and chaos. America has, and
intends to keep, military strengths beyond
challenge  thereby, making the destabil-
izing arms races of other eras pointless, and
limiting rivalries to trade and other pur-
suits of peace.
These words reflect the view that the US
needs to have military capabilities large
enough to be able to deter potential com-
petitors and regional rivals from the outset.
This is meant to stop would-be rivals from
aspiring to a position of dominance and
challenging the US-defined international
order.
If there is one state that American con-
servatives fear as a hegemonic rival in a key
region, it is first and foremost China that
they have looked to for years. Prior to
September 11, there was a general con-
sensus in the strategic community that
China would represent the greatest foreign
policy challenge. The question repeatedly
asked was whether China would develop
into a regional hegemonic power and
become competitor to the US for control in
Asia. Of greatest concern has been Chinas
economic and military potential and the
potential for a change in the balance of
power. Pessimists feared that China could
make great strides in catching up with the
US; optimists stressed the huge gap that
still exists. The potential for military con-
flict remains current due to the Taiwanese
question, even if the military and techno-
logical gap is not narrowing, the power
relationship in the Pacific and the Taiwan
Straits remains in the USs favor, and
Chinas intentions do not appear aggres-
sive. A blockade of Taiwan would result in a
dangerous military confrontation which
could easily turn into a war. While the US
has not expressly committed itself to pro-
tecting Taiwan militarily, it has clearly
articulated its interest in Taiwans security
in its policy of strategic ambiguity.
The geopolitical power conflict with
China is most strongly perceived by those
American conservatives who doubt that the
policy of engagement will truly bring about
the desired domestic changes within China
and consequent changes to Chinas foreign
policy. In the first months of the Bush
administration, this suspicion found ex-
pression in the often repeated characteri-
zation of China as a strategic rival.
After September 11, China as a potential
adversary was replaced by an actually
existing foe. For the time being, that
brought to an end the rather heated con-
troversy about a future military conflict
with China. The issue has been pushed into
the background, but the substantial con-
flicts in American-Chinese relations have
not gone away, despite the seemingly
improved atmosphere.
Whether a coincidence or not, much of
what is currently taking place under the
banner of the War on Terrorism improves
the conditions for containing China  the
new military presence in Central Asia,
which can be expected to be maintained for
a long time, the return of the US military
to the Philippines, and the reestablishment
of contact with the Indonesian military,
which had been broken in 1999 as a result
of human rights considerations. In this
sense, the US is using the fight against
terrorism to shore up its geopolitical
position as part of a policy of military
supremacy.
The Doctrine of Preventive War
The second guiding principle is a doctrine
of military preemption against terrorist
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groups and dictators who attempt to
acquire weapons of mass destruction.
According to the Bush administration, the
US is in a long-term war, not just against
terrorist organizations, but also against
terrorist states that could threaten the
security of the US and its allies with
weapons of mass destruction.
It is undoubtedly difficult, if not im-
possible, to deter non-state actors who,
acting on the basis of their religious-
ideological belief systems, are prepared to
commit suicide. Yet, the US rejection of
deterrence and containment goes even
further, as President Bush clearly expressed
in his address at West Point on June 1,
2002: For much of the last century,
Americas defense relied on the Cold War
doctrines of deterrence and containment.
In some cases, those strategies still apply.
But new threats also require new thinking.
Deterrence  the promise of massive
retaliation against nations  means nothing
against shadowy terrorist networks with no
nation or citizens to defend. Containment
is not possible when unbalanced dictators
with weapons of mass destruction can
deliver those weapons or missiles or
secretly provide them to terrorist allies.
The Bush Doctrine, as it has developed
since September 11, extends the bounds of
what is considered legitimate self-defense.
The current administration actually claims
the right of anticipatory self-defense. That
goes beyond preventive strikes against
facilities for the production of weapons of
mass destruction, which has long been a
strategic option after the extent of the Iraqi
armaments program became clear in the
first half of the nineties. Although seldom
mentioned, counterproliferation under
Clinton also allowed for offensive options,
as then Defense Minister Perry made clear
in his somewhat guarded policy pronounce-
ments regarding North Korea in 1994.
There is, however, a difference between
preemption as a discrete option held in
reserve and the development of an explicit
doctrine of preventive defense. This could,
as critics fear, become a straightjacket,
leading American decision-makers to act
prematurely.
More importantly, implementation of
the doctrine would mean a renunciation of
the norms and institutions of the inter-
national system which the US was so
involved in helping to develop in the last
century. And, as Henry Kissinger recently
noted, the doctrine is even revolutionary; it
is a fundamental challenge to the modern
international system with its reliance on
the notion of sovereignty. The US is essen-
tially claiming the right to conduct a pre-
ventive war against states that are now or
could in the future present a potential
security threat.
A war against Iraq with the goal of over-
throwing the regime would essentially be a
preventive war, even if apologists like to
use the word preemptive. Such wars have
often been fought and justified in modern
times as a means of maintaining the Euro-
pean balance of power. But this time the
goal is also to change the internal political
structure of the opponent. Iraq represents a
hypothetical threat with far reaching geo-
political implications. In a speech delivered
August 26, Vice President Richard Cheney
described a vision of a future threat from
an Iraq that someday has nuclear weapons
and the full spectrum of weapons of mass
destruction in the following manner:
Armed with an arsenal of these weapons
of terror and set a top ten percent of the
worlds oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could
then be expected to seek domination of
the entire Middle East, take control of a
great portion of the worlds energy sup-
plies, directly threaten Americas friends
throughout the region, and subject
the United States or any other nation to
nuclear blackmail.
Supporting Freedom in the
Islamic World
The third guiding principle involves
supporting freedom in the Islamic world.
This is also a consequence of September 11.
The traditional policy vis-à-vis friendly
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Arab states, namely the acceptance of
political repression in the interest of
regime stability, is being questioned more
and more.
The reason why democracy and human
rights play such a minor role in American
Middle East policy is due to the fear that
Islamist groups could come to power.
Islamism, a type of political activism that
entails a particular understanding of the
Islamic state and politics, and which is
mistakenly referred to as Islamic funda-
mentalism, has represented a challenge
for the foreign policy of the United States
(and others states) since the Islamic revo-
lution in Iran. The strengthening of
Islamist forces was viewed as a threat to the
key interests of American Middle East
policy, namely the security of Israel and the
stability of the client states in the Persian
Gulf. With the Islamic revolution in Iran,
this threat took concrete form. Americas
foreign policy nightmare of an Islamic state
that threatens the regional order, rejects
the Arab-Israeli peace process, supports
terrorism, and seeks nuclear weapons
appeared to become a reality in Iran. The
experience with Iran has since determined
the perception of Islamist movements.
In the nineties, militant Islam was con-
sidered the biggest threat to American
interests in the region. It rejected the con-
cept of land for peace as the basis for
peace and threatened American influence
in the oil states of the Persian Gulf. The
destabilization of Egypt and the Gulf states
was particularly regarded as a threat to the
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
which the Clinton administration saw a
historic chance at resolving. Although the
issue of political reform was not entirely
ignored by the administration, the Middle
East was exempted from Clintons highly
touted guiding foreign policy doctrine of
enlarging the zone of democratic states.
On the issue of democratization,
American Middle East experts repeatedly
articulated the view that the US could not
continue to carry on its traditional policy
in this region. This opinion has been
expressed loudly following September 11,
including amongst Republicans. The fact
that a significant number of the hijackers
came from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two key
states for American policy, raised great
concern. The internal structures of these
states are viewed as a breeding ground for
Islamist extremism. September 11 made it
clearer than ever before that the US is an
indirect target of Islamist terrorists
because it is regarded as the protector of
those regimes the terrorists want to over-
throw.
One of the big challenges facing the
foreign policy of America (and not just it
alone) is to support the democratic opening
of the autocratic regimes in the Middle East
so that the social forces seeking political
participation are given a chance. If the US
draws back from this challenge, it will
further feed the widespread and basically
accurate perception in the Arab world of a
hypocritical foreign policy that in principal
propagates democracy, but in practice
treats the Arab world as an exception.
Certainly, the US has influence due to its
economic aid to Egypt and its security guar-
antees in the Persian Gulf. A change of
course in American policy can take the
form of applying pressure on governments
in the region to initiate political and
economic reforms. Establishing and
strengthening relations with demo-
cratically orientated civic organizations
is another possibility. This would require,
above all, a revised, more differentiated
view of Islamist movements and attempts
to conduct talks with its moderate wing
and their organizations.
The Bush administration appears about
to go at least a little way in closing the
gap of credibility between talking about
freedom and democracy in the Middle East
and the actual policies pursued. On the one
hand, the US talks about militarily over-
throwing Saddam Hussein as a means of
democratizing Iraq and calls upon Pales-
tinians to elect a new leadership. On the
other hand, at the same time it does and
says next to nothing about human rights
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violations in states such as Egypt and Saudi
Arabia and collaborates with undemocratic
regimes like Syria, Yemen and Algeria in
the fight against terrorism. Such contra-
dictions undermine the credibility of
American policy.
An announcement of a modest program
for supporting political and economic
reforms in Arab states, which is likely to
include seminars for political activists,
journalists, and trade unionists, has been
scheduled for the Fall. Such initiatives are
not likely to have much of an impact in the
short-term. But the Middle East is no longer
excluded from the American foreign policy
goal of supporting democratic develop-
ments. The consequences of this policy shift
should not be underestimated.
New Support for Foreign Aid
Foreign aid for states in the region is also
being reexamined to determine how funds
can be more effectively invested in order to
support economic and political reforms. In
general, a reevaluation of this foreign
policy instrument is evident as a con-
sequence of September 11. The end of the
Cold War and the dissolution of the
coalition between liberals interested in
development aid and conservatives
primarily interested in military aid resulted
in foreign aid falling to an all time low.
There was somewhat of a revival of interest
in foreign aid even prior to September 11.
A new coalition of liberals and religious
conservatives lobbied for more money to
fight AIDS in Africa and to ease the debt
burden of the poorest states.
September 11 provided increased legiti-
macy for foreign aid, not only as a reward
for those states that cooperate in the war
on terrorism, but also in light of the
experience in Afghanistan as an element of
a sustained struggle against terrorism.
Foreign aid expenditures have already been
increased, with the lions share going to
support cooperating states, especially
Pakistan. President Bush announced in
March this year that foreign aid is to be
raised by $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2004 and
a further $3.3 billion in fiscal year 2005.
The President has declared  and this is not
unimportant  that combating poverty is
part of the war on terrorism.
The Senate passed a resolution in June
2002 which expressed the intention of
raising foreign aid by 25% per annum over
the next five years. How much of that will
actually be appropriated is uncertain. Only
a portion of these funds is used in the strict
sense of development aid, and, up to now,
only 40 percent of foreign aid goes to the
poorest states. The decision over how to use
the additional resources  either as support
and reward for strategically important
states or for a sustained fight against
poverty  will be the source of considerable
debate in the administration and Congress.
In this regard, it is interesting to note
that Congress, at least as far as Afghanistan
is concerned, appears more willing to
engage in nation-building than the still
hesitant Bush administration. The Foreign
Relations Committee has doubled the
budget for the operation in Afghanistan.
This Congressional policy seems to reflect
the view that the globalization of informal
violence (Robert O. Keohane) has made
untenable the territorial realist premise of
foreign policy, which differentiates
between geopolitically important and geo-
politically unimportant countries.
Domestic Political Constraints
It is in no way certain that September 11
has changed the domestic political context
of American foreign policy to such an
extent that the neoconservative network
can carry out its agenda on a sustained
basis. Alone the growing budget deficit sets
limits on such a development. The alarmist
language President Bush uses and the talk
of a long-term massive threat that requires
an immense increase in the military
budget, are part of an effort to permanently
mobilize domestic political support for an
American policy of global leadership.
September 11 made possible a massive
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defense build-up that the domestic political
situation would have previously not
allowed. For the most part, the defense
program has little to do with the fight
against terrorism, such as the purchase of
new fighter jets and destroyers. September
11 was also a catalytic event in terms of the
construction of a missile defense system.
The decision to withdraw from the ABM
treaty was based on the political calculation
that the situation was opportune and the
foreign and domestic political costs would
be minimal. In foreign policy terms, Presi-
dent Putins interest in integration into the
West was so strong that Moscow was not
expected to present a major problem.
Basically, Americas Russia policy did not
change following September 11, rather Rus-
sias America policy changed. The decisive
factor has been Putin, who is counting on
close relations with the US and Western
industrial states in the interests of the eco-
nomic modernization of his country.
Had it not been for September 11, the
Presidents withdrawal from the ABM treaty
would have certainly been highly contro-
versial. Bush did not provide the Senate
with any say in the matter, a move that is
constitutionally problematic. Last Summer
the Democrats were in the process of
making missile defense a hot-button issue.
But after September 11 these plans simply
dissolved. Democrats in the House wanted
to force a vote on the Presidents decision to
withdraw from the treaty, but the initiative
was blocked in a vote of 254 to 169. A sub-
sequent legal challenge by 31 members of
Congress is likely to remain unsuccessful.
That does not mean there will be no
debate between the administration and
Congress over the build-up and effective-
ness of a missile defense system. The Missile
Defense Agency is trying through secrecy to
avoid Congressional oversight, but will not
likely succeed in the long run, especially as
soon as the focus turns to the costs for the
layered defense system. One estimate of the
Congressional Budget Office puts the price
tag at $200 billion over the next two
decades.
Although willing to show national unity,
Congress is not willing to give up its in-
fluence over foreign policy. Approval for
the Presidents policy has not resulted in
granting a blank check for the deployment
of American forces to fight against inter-
national terrorism. President Bush also
failed early on in his attempt to get
Congresss approval for removing all legal
limitations for the next five years on
military aid and arms exports for the sake
of the fight against terrorism.
Congress is ready to follow the President
on matters directly related to the fight
against terrorism. But Congress is wary of
attempts by the President to use the new
threat to expand powers that are not
directly related to this goal. Despite all the
efforts and successes of President Bush to
expand the power of the highest office  an
attempt, in fact, to return to an imperial
Presidency  the claims of Congress to a say
in foreign policy, which have been growing
since the seventies, cannot be repressed for
long.
The foreign policy debate in the US is
gradually returning to normal. Despite the
continuing high public support for the
Presidents foreign policy, some leading
Democrats, in particular potential Presi-
dential candidates, are daring again to
criticize the Presidents policies.
The beginning of the debate over Iraq in
Congress will provide clues about the
extent to which the self-control mechan-
isms of the American political system con-
tinue to work. Clear, convincingly argued
positions of European partners on the
contested issues can only help.
Translation: Darren Hall
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